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The main aim of this paper is to study the European regional disparities in the labour market, 
considering the regional productive structures and some regional institutional variables. It is 
widely known that one of the EU’s most important stylized facts are the regional disparities 
among regions. Such differences are related mostly to the income per capita and to the labour 
market captured through the unemployment rates. In a recent paper (Amendola, Caroleo 
Coppola, 2004) we analyzed the economic structure of the EU’s regions through some proxies 
of the productive assets and of the labour markets. In this paper we estimate a Panel data where 
the dependent variable is the regional unemployment rate and the independent variables are 
some variables related to the productive structure and some regional institutional aspects. The 
results we obtain confirm that the institutional variables, such as the centralization of wage 
bargaining, the decentralization of public expenditure and the bureaucracy level, play  an 
important impacts on the unemployment rates. 
 





The problem of  the regional disparities is a crucial theme in the debate on the economic and politic 
process of the construction of the European Union. In fact if we compare the United States with the 
European Union, we find that the convergence process is slower in the Old Continent. Moreover in 
the same periods the disparities among regions persist or increase.   
  1As a matter of fact it is possible to find many examples about the persistence of the regional 
disparities: the unsolved problem of the German unification (Marani, 2004), the absence of growth 
for many less-developed regions in the Mediterranean Europe (Caroleo e Destefanis 2005), the slow 
transition of the East European countries (Perugini e Signorelli 2004). 
The implications for the economic theory and for the policy issues are very important. In fact there 
is not a growth theory so far, as for instance the neoclassic theory, the endogenous theory, and the 
new economic geography, that can fully explain the European case (European Commission 2000; 
De la Fuente 2000). While, as concerns the political economy aspects, it can be noted how the EU’s 
cohesion policy has not been able to promote the economic integration, prerequisite for the full 
running of the fiscal and monetary policy of the European Union  (Boldrin e Canova 2001; 
Ederveen e Gorter 2002). In this debate there is an almost unanimous consent in believing that the 
institutional and economic conditions, acting to regulate the labour market, have important effects 
on the convergence process. In fact regional convergence is measured in terms of GDP per capita 
and/or in terms of employment rate and productivity level. The econometric estimates confirm that 
the slow convergence process and the existence of clusters of homogenous regions in the EU,- 
converging in their inside, but diverging among them- is caused by the employment rate dynamics 
(European Commission 2004, for a survey Daniele 2002) and, consequently, by the labour market 
characteristics. In so far it is important to study those institutional mechanisms that regulate the 
labour market, as well as the characteristics of the labour demand and supply and their dependence  
on spatial factors (Nienhur, 2000) 
As said before, the employment rate is the variable that may better explain the labour market 
conditions in the contest of the economic development studies and regional convergence. Since the 
Lisbon European Council, the European employment strategy itself has defined quantitative 
objectives based on the employment rate. At the same time a greater number of scientific articles 
(Marelli 2004 e 2005; Garibaldi  e Mauro 2002) have studied the regional disparities by analyzing 
this variable.  
  2On the other side, according to a wide consensus born in Europe and influenced by the OECD’s 
prescriptions, the Eurosclerosis problem in the Nineties is  seen as the consequence of the 
institutional rigidities in the European labour market that have caused the growth of the equilibrium 
unemployment. The underlined theory of these thesis shows the existence of a structural 
unemployment rate, that is the equilibrium rate to which the labour market converges when, in 
absence of exogenous shocks, all prices and wages are completely adjusted (Layard et al. 1991). In 
this framework, the empirical analysis tries to demonstrate how the different unemployment 
dynamics of the European countries depend mostly on micro-level real labour market frictions, such 
as the wage bargaining power of the workers and/or of the unions, the information and incentive at 
firm-level, the job search and matching efficiency (Nickell, 1997; Nickell e Layard, 1999; 
Blanchard e Wolfers, 2000; for a survey see also Caroleo, 2000).  
The basic idea of this study is that the regional and/or national disparities in Europe are caused both 
by the different productive structure and by technological and economic conditions that determines 
the employment levels, and also by different institutional assets of the labour market. In other words 
we think that those factors may contribute to create or to sustain the divergence or persistence of 
disparities among regions.  
The next paragraph contains some stylized facts that show how the unemployment rate is able to 
better represent the regional differences in the labour market. In the third paragraph we list the 
variables chosen to explain the functional relationship between the unemployment rate, as the 
dependent variable, and the productive structure and  the institutional assets. Furthermore we 
explain the methodology used to obtain those variables (§ 3). In the last paragraph the results of the 
econometric estimations are reported. The conclusions contain some final comments. 
 
1. The stylized facts  
 
  3The most important stylized fact in the European Union is shown in the graphs 1 and 2, where are 
represented the index number of the mean, mean square error, and coefficient of variation of the 
employment rate (graph 1), and of the unemployment rate (graph 2) relating to 130 European 
regions for the period 1991 to 2000. We can observe two important stylized facts: the first one is 
that in the Nineties the unemployment rate has shown a higher cycle than the employment rate, and 
the other one is that the variability of the unemployment rate at regional level has been higher than 
the employment rate. 
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Figure 2. The  Unemployment rate: Mean, Mean Square Deviation, and Coefficient of 






































This second stylized fact leads us to find  those variables that affect the unemployment rate in order 
to analyze the regional disparities. Elrhost (2000) makes a list of some regional variables 
concerning with the labour market that may cause divergence processes among regions. They can 
  5be synthesized in the different endowment in the product factors and in the “fundamentals”; in the 
different local labour market structure (Genre e Gòmez-Salvador, 2002) –demographic growth, 
population age-structure, migration and commuting (Greenway, Upward e Wright, 2002); in the 
employment levels; in the productive structure (Marelli, 2003; Paci e Pigliaru, 1999; Paci, Pigliaru e 
Pugno, 2002); in the demographic density and urbanization (Taylor e Bradley 1997); in the 
economic and social barriers; in the human capital; in the institutional structure regulating the good 
markets and the labour market, and also the wages composition (Pench e Sestito e Frontini,1999; 
Hyclack e Johnes 1987). 
Without expecting to be exhaustive, we want to test some of the theses above mentioned. To this 
end we want to estimate the relationship between the unemployment rate, measured at the regional 
level, and a set of variable that includes some institutional indicators and the most important 
regional economic characteristics. 
 
 
2. The set of the independent variables.  
 
The set of the independent variables used in our analysis may be classified into three groups: (a) 
productive structure and labour market indicators, (b) institutional indicators and (c) variables of the 
economic performance. 
Indicators of the productive structure and labour market 
We begin to estimate a proxy of the labour market and productive structures of the regions. To this 
end, we calculate two indicators by applying a dynamic multivariate factorial analysis. This method 
is very useful to study multidimensional phenomena like the regional disparities. In fact the regions 
(cases) may be analyzed on the base of a set of indicators (variables) that change over the years 
(time). 
  6We choose (Amendola, Caroleo, Coppola 2004) to apply the STATIS (Structuration des Tables A 
Trois Indeces de la Statistique) method (Escoufier 1985 e 1987). This is a dynamic multivariate 
method that is able to cluster the regions for several years on the base of  a set of variables including 
indicators of labour market and income, variables of the composition of the population and of the 
structure of the productive sector. In this way it is possible to study the interaction chances between 
the labour market structure and the economic growth over time. In this contest, it is also possible to 
analyze the dynamics of the regions.  
The variables used for this analysis are listed in Table 3.2. They are taken from the Eurostat REGIO 
database and the European regions database of Cambridge Econometrics Ltd. and they are, as said, 
indicators characteristic of the labour market and the production system (Wishlade and Yuill, 1997). 
The labour demand is measured by the unemployment rate on the total working-age population 
(TOT), while the labour supply is measured by the labour-force participation rate (TAT). The 
percentage of the long-term unemployed (ULR) is used as a proxy for the structural gap between 
labour demand and supply. The percentage of part-time employment (PTT) is used as a measure of 
the flexibility of the regional labour market. 
The production system is represented by four variables corresponding to the percentages of 
employed persons in agriculture (AGR), industry (IND), traditional services – commerce, hotels 
and non-market services (GHM) – and advanced services – transport, financial services and others 
(IJA). The other variables considered are population density (DEN), as a proxy for the gravitational 
force of a region, and per capita income (PPS), which is the indicator most frequently used to 
represent regional disparities. 
  7 
Table 1 
Variables used in the STATIS analysis 
N Code Variable  Index 
1  DEN  Population density  Inhabitants /sq km 
2  TAT  total activity rate  labour  force/population 
aged over 15 
3 TOT  employment  rate  employed/population aged 
over 15 








6 AGR percentage  employment 
in agriculture 
employed in agriculture/ 
total employed 
7 IND  percentage  employment 
in industry 
employed in industry/total 
employed 
8 GHM percentage  employment 
in traditional services 
employed in retail trade, 
hotels and non-market 
services /total employed  
9 IJA  percentage  employment 
in advanced services 
employed in transport, 
financial and other 
services/total employed  
10  PPS  per  capita  income  per capita GDP in 
Purchasing Power Standard 
 
The European regions represent 130 cases. The level of the territorial disaggregation of the 
European regions selected was intended to cover the entire territory and to provide the maximum 
disaggregation possible with the data available. This level corresponds to the Nuts 2 level for 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria and Portugal; Nuts 1 for Belgium, Germany, Holland, Finland, 
the United Kingdom; Nuts 0 for Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden, for which countries 
there are no Nuts 1 and Nuts 2 disaggregations (or data are not available with which to perform 
such disaggregations)1. The time period is 1991- 2000. 
The STATIS methodology, as said, consists in the analysis of the three-way matrix (tXij), 
where t denotes the temporal observations, i the regions, and j the variables (i=1,2...I; j=1,2...J; 
t=1,2...T), obtained by the succession of T matrices  of the same dimensions.  j i t X ,
The analysis moves through three phases: interstructure, compromise and infrastructure. The 
output from the interstructure phase describes the structure of the T matrices in a vectorial space 
  8smaller than T. This is reduced to two dimensions but still maintains a good similarity to the initial 
representation. The compromise phase consists in the estimation of a synthesis matrix which yields 
a representation, in the two-dimensional space identified, of the characteristic indicators and of the 
average positions of the regions in the time-span analysed (1991-2000). The result of this 
intrastructure phase is a representation of the trajectories followed by the individual regions in the 
same period of time. 
Table 2 
Eigenvalues and inertia percentages of the factorial axes 
Axis  Eigenvalue  Variance explained  Cumulated variance 
explained 
1 3.75547 36.76 36.76 
2 1.99895 19.56 56.32 
3 1.18853 11.63 67.95 
 
In order to evaluate the goodness of the factorial representation yielded by construction of the 
compromise matrix, Table 2 shows the first three highest eigenvalues and the percentage of the total 
variance explained by the first three factorial axes. 
To be noted first is that 36.8% of the variance is explained by the first factor, and 19.6% by the 
second, for a total of 56.3% of the variance expressed by the set of all the variables. In other words, 
the first factor alone explains more than one-third of the total variability, while the first three factors 
jointly explain almost 68%. Consequently, the reduction of the phenomenon’s variability, obtained 
by representing it in a two-dimensional space, is a meaningful synthesis of the information 
considered. 
In order to interpret the two figures, we may refer to Table 2, which shows that minimum and 
maximum period values of the correlations between the variables and the factorial axes. It will be 
seen that the variables most closely correlated with the first factor are, on the one hand, the 
employment rate (TOT), the activity rate (TAT), the percentage of part-time employment (PTT), 
per capita income (PPS), and the percentage of employment in advanced services; and on the other 
(positive quadrant), the percentage of long-term unemployment (ULR), and the percentage of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 The complete list of the 130 regions is given in the Appendix. 
  9employment in agriculture (AGR). In other words, along the first axis one observes a clear 
polarization between the labour market indicators and those relative to the production structure. 
Along the second axis one observes a close correlation among, on the one hand, population 
density (DEN), per capita income (PPS), and the percentages of employment in traditional services 
(GHM) and advanced services (IJA), and on the other, percentage of employment in industry (IND) 
and in agriculture (AGR), and the employment rate (TOT). In this case, we may state that the 
second axis identifies in marked manner only the phenomena representing variables located in the 
positive quadrant, namely those correlated with the territorial dimension. In fact, the indicators in 
this quadrant represent highly urbanized areas, or ones which contain rail or road infrastructures or 
sea ports, or with high levels of tourism. The negative quadrant, by contrast, comprises indicators 
which are more difficult to interpret and concern a mix of factors, such as low population density, 
the presence of agricultural employment, and high levels of industry2. 
Table 2 
Correlations between the variables and the factorial axes (minimum and maximum period values) 
Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3 
  Min Max    Min Max    Min Max
TAT -0.83 -0.75  IND  -0.51 -0.47 IND  -0.77  -0.71
TOT -0.78 -0.72  TOT  -0.42 -0.37 PPS -0.36  -0.27
PTT -0.76 -0.69  AGR  -0.36 -0.34 ULR  -0.18  0.07
PPS -0.69 -0.63  TAT  -0.34 -0.30 GHM -0.09  -0.04
IJA -0.66 -0.64  PTT  -0.11 -0.03 TOT  0.14  0.25
IND -0.34 -0.22  IJA  0.27 0.30 IJA  0.14  0.20
DEN -0.30 -0.29  ULR  0.30 0.38 DEN  0.15  0.16
GHM -0.17 -0.07  PPS  0.33 0.36 TAT  0.19  0.32
ULR 0.58 0.64  GHM  0.64 0.73 PTT  0.21  0.33
AGR 0.70 0.72  DEN  0.73 0.73 AGR  0.47  0.49
Source: Our calculations on Eurostat REGIO data and on the Cambridge Econometrics database 
 
In conclusion the European regions seem to place along the two factorial axes that represent some 
characteristics of the labour market and the productive structure. The first factor (FF) can be 
interpreted as a proxy of the “bad” performance of the labour market. It is useful to point out that 
the variable has an opposite sign with respect to development factor: the regions that have a good 
performance in term of activity rate and employment rate, and higher income per capita levels, have 
                                                           
2 see Amendola, Caroleo Coppola 2004) for a more complete analysis. 
  10negative value of this factor. On the contrary those regions that have low activity and employment 
rates and a high percentage employed in agriculture.  
The second factor (SF)  may be interpreted as a factor that is positive correlated with the 
urbanization and a high developed tertiary sector. 
Institutional Variables 
If the first factor, obtained by STATIS, may be interpreted as the level of efficiency and of 
flexibility of the labour market, a further indicator of the rigidity/flexibility of the labour market 
may be found in the degree of decentralization of those institutions regulating the labour market 
and, particularly, the level of wage bargaining centralization  (Calmfors, 1993; Calmfors e Driffil, 
1988). 
For a long time, the “European model” has been characterized by wage bargaining strictly related 
with the industrial relations, or rather, with an institutional framework aimed at the employment 
protection, centralized, universalistic and egalitarian. Nevertheless in the last years many things 
have changed. A new trend, regarding the need to decentralize the labour market policies at a sub 
national level (i.e. regional), has been developed according to the thesis that considers the 
participation in bargaining by the local institution as a way to reach a higher level of regional 
cohesion in the EU (Buti, Pench e Sestito, 1998; Soltwedel, Dohse e Kreige-Boden, 1999). 
Usually the debate on bargaining has been focused on the centralized or decentralized wage 
bargaining as a vertical kind of bargaining (i.e from national to firm level) (Freeman e Gibbson 
1993). The firm-level bargaining is considered by the OECD (OECD,1999) the only one that may 
reduce  the regional disparities since it binds the bargained wage to the different local labour market 
conditions and to the different regional labour productivity (for the Italian case see Antonelli e 
Paganetto (1999),  Biagioli, Caroleo and Destefanis (1999) and, more recently, Dell’Aringa (2005)). 
There are many possible objections to this approach. As a matter of fact it has been pointed out that 
there is a variety of bargaining modalities (bargaining at regional level or by skills) and, on the 
other side, that there is a coordination problem (Amendola, Caroleo e Garofalo, 1997). 
  11If we consider these two aspects together, it is possible to show that the economic performance can 
be improved both by a centralized and by a decentralized bargaining. 
It may be useful to underline that the bargaining decentralization cannot be separated from the 
industrial relation assets. This crucial aspect is important in order to better understand the reasons of 
a bargaining reform aimed at decentralizing the wage bargaining, but that at the same time takes 
into account the different institutional framework and the coordination issues 
In  other words the industrial relations concern that security system built up to protect the 
employment like the security (i) against the risk of the future unemployment and the job 
precariousness, (ii) against the barriers to the Human capital development, (iii) against the 
restriction on the right to work and against the (iv) low representativeness of the workers. 
These industrial relations should be adjusted according to the characteristics of  the local labour 
markets. In fact, the labour market policies are aimed at implementing active policies that are 
appropriate to the different local labour market characteristics, with also different applicatory 
approaches that involve several actors and procedures.  
A decentralized industrial relations system need to go beyond a mere decentralization of the 
administrative bureaucratic system. It should involve the most important local actors, implement 
shared actions with shared responsibilities (Regini, 2002, Arrighetti e Seravalli, 1999).  
This is the only way to obtain a kind of employment growth that is both quantitative and qualitative, 
or, in other words, to make more flexible the labour market without loosing the necessary securities. 
For this reason the new approach of decentralization of the industrial relations has been interpreted 
as a tendency to the local and territorial “negotiations “ that assumes the form of a pact among the 
interested social parts.  
For our analysis it would be useful to find, as a proxy of the institutional decentralization of the 
labour market, a variable related to the level of decentralized bargaining and to the degree of the 
regional industrial relations system. Unfortunately, homogeneous data at the European level are not 
available, therefore we can only use the traditional indicator of the bargaining centralization 
  12(CENTR) that combines the levels of wage bargaining centralization with the wage coordination 
among the most important trade unions (Checchi e Lucifora 2002; Boeri, Brugiavini e Calmfors 
2002). 
The underlying hypothesis is that if the trade union bargains the wage at the level of the single firm 
it will better take into account the firm productivity level, that surely is affected by the local 
economic conditions. 
A further institutional aspect considered in our analysis is the administrative decentralization of the 
public administration. We choose two indicators for this aspect: the first one  is the degree of 
centralization of public expenditure (CFG)  and the second one is an index of bureaucracy 
(BUREAUCRACY).  The first one has been calculated as the ratio between the expenditure of the 
central administration over the total public expenditure3. The lower is this ratio, the higher it will be 
the percentage of the expenditure of the local administration. The ratio represents, in our opinion, a 
good proxy of the decentralized power of the public expenditure at  the regional level. The index of 
bureaucracy is not disaggregated at national level, and can be considered as a proxy of the Public 
Administration efficiency4. 
Variables or the economic performance of the regions 
The third group of variables contains two wide-used regional development indexes: the percentage 
variation of the Gross Value Added at constant price (GRPR) and the investment per capita, 
measured as investment per inhabitants (INVPOP)56. 
                                                           
3 The variable has been calculated as the ratio between the total expenditure minus the local expenditure over the total 
expenditure. (Fonts: IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook & supplement Finance statistics Yearbook 2003). 
4This variable is contained in the data bank www.countrydata.com  and it is an indicator of a  quality of bureaucracy at 
national level.  
5The last two variables are from European Regions databank of the Cambridge Econometrics Ltd of the.  
6The values of the variables CENTR, CGF, BUREAUCRACY are at national level and we suppose that they are the 
same for the regions of a same country. In the Econometric estimations we do not consider Luxembourg (1 region), 
Greece (13 regions) and Portugal (7 regions). The regions excluded by the econometric analysis are 21 since for these 
countries the variable CENTR is not available.   
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List of the Dependent Variables 
Acronym Variables 
CONS   Constant 
FF  Index factor of the labour market’s performance 
(the variable has an opposite sign related to development’s index) 
SF  Index factor of tertiary/urbanization 
CENTR   bargaining centralization index 
CGF  level of public expenditure centralization 
BUREAUCRACY Bureaucracy’  index 




3. The Estimation Method: The Panel Data analysis  
 
Our dataset is a Panel Data where the cases are the regions e the time units are the years from 1991 
to 2000. For this reasons we apply the Panel data econometric methods to study the relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the set of the independent variables  
The model may be written as 
it it it z x y ε α β α + + + =
' '
0  [1] 
where  ,  .   is the constant,  n i ,....... 1 = T t . ,......... 1 = 0 a β  is the vector of coefficients,   contains K 
regressors and the matrix  , is a set of not observable variables that captures the specific effects 
related to the characteristics of the individuals that are, in our study, 109 European regions
it x
it z
7.  it ε   is 
the error term.  
The variables in   are not observed and may be correlated or not correlated with the regressors. In 
the first case in the model [1] the intercept is group specific and it is constant over the time. This is 
the Fixed Effects model and may be written as:  
it z
it i it it x a y ε α β + + + =
'
0    [2] 
                                                           
7 As we say before, the variable CENTR is not available for some nations. 
  14In the second case the model is defined as a Random Effects model. The variables of the matrix   
are unobservable and uncorrelated with the  . In this case the model becomes  
it z
it x
it i it it u x y ε β α + + + =
'
0  [3] 
where   is the group-specific stochastic term.    i u
The difference between the fixed effect and the random effect model is in the nature of the 
individual component  i α  (in the fixed model)  and   in the random model. In the fixed effects 
model,  
i u
i α  is deterministic and captures the individual characteristics. It assumes different values 
for each single individual, it is constant over time and, being related with the characteristics of the 
individual, is correlated with the variables  . In the Random Effects model, the term   has a 
group specific random distribution. The term   is a stochastic variable and is not correlated with 
the , because these variables are not stochastic. 
i x i u
i u
i x
The Fixed Effect model is reasonably used for territorial – intercountry or interregional – 
comparisons, as in our case, as we can plausibly suppose that the not observed characteristics 
captured in the variables are constant over the time (Green, 2003). Anyway we can test what is the 
better specification – fixed effect or random effect – by the Hausmann test8. 
The model estimated is the following one: 
it i it it it
it it it it it it
CGF CGF CENTR
Y BUREAUCRAC INVPOP GDPR SF FF a UNRATE
ε ν β β β
β β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
2                  8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1  
where  is the constant,  a 8 1......β β  are the parameters,  i υ  is the individual component and it ε  the 
error term. The acronyms of the variables are reported in the previous list.  The variable that 
measures the level of public expenditure centralization (CFG) is considered also in its quadratic 
                                                           
8 This Test is based on the statistics   () ( ) ( ) r f r f r f V V W β β β β − − − =
−1 '
where  f β and r β  are respectively the 
fixed effects and the random effect coefficients and   , . are their relative variance-covariance matrixes. Under the 
null hypothesis the statistics W  is distributed as a 
f V r V
( ) k
2 χ where  k  is the number of coefficients inβ , intercept 
excluded. The null hypothesis in no correlation between the stochastic term and   , and so the absence of any 
systematic difference between the Random effects  and fixed effects coefficients. In the first case Random Effects are 
it x
  15form (CFG2) in order to test the hypothesis of a quadratic relationship of this variable with the 
unemployment rate and, consequently, the existence of an optimal dimension in the degree of 
centralization of public expenditure.  
 
Results 
The Table 4 contains the results. In the third and fourth columns are reported respectively the 
Random Effects and the Fixed Effects estimates. For sake of completeness this table includes also 
the OLS estimation (column 1) and the Random effect model results obtained by the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (columns 1).  
The signs of the coefficients, obtained by the four estimation methods, are always the same. The 
Hausmann test does not accept the null hypothesis of absence of correlation between the dependent 
variables and the error terms. This is the fundamental hypothesis of the Random effects model, and 
being not accepted, we can conclude that the Fixed Effect model is the well specified model.  
The result confirms the theories of the previous paragraphs. Particularly in the Fixed Effect Model 
the coefficients are all statistically significative and they have the expected sign. Only the variable 
GDPR – the annual growth rate of the gross value added per capita- is significative only at the 8%. 
The dependent variables are expressed in different measures. Accordingly, in order to compare the 
dimension of their effects on the unemployment rate, we calculate the standard coefficients9 of the 
variables and the elasticity to their mean value (tab. 5) 10. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
better than Fixed Effects  because the Random Effects are more efficient. In the opposite case the Fixed Effects are 
consistent.   








i i β β =  where  x β  is the parameter of the variable ,  and   are 
respectively the standard deviations of the variable   and y. It may be useful to make an example to better understand 
the meaning of  the standard coefficients. The standard coefficient of the variable SF (Table 5) is 0.6; this means that a 
unit standard deviation of SF causes a standard deviation of the unemployment rate equal to 0.6.  
i x x s y s
i x







E x x ∂
∂
= = β .  It may be useful to point out 
that the standard coefficients, even if they are more difficult to analyse, are constant for all the values of the relative 
  16Summary and Conclusions 
 The results obtained seem to confirm our initial thesis: the unemployment rate is correlated with 
the decentralization level of the wage bargaining, with the institutional efficiency of the regions, 
and also with the bureaucracy level, even if the impact of this variable on the unemployment rate is 
small.   
The centralization level of the public expenditure has a quadratic relationship with the 
unemployment rate. This means that the unemployment level grows together with the public 
expenditure centralization degree, but in a less than proportional way, until a value of the 
centralization ratio equal to 75%. After that value the unemployment decreases. Nevertheless, we 
need to be cautious in interpreting this result since the sign of the variables CGF and CFG2 is 
opposite in the OLS Method.      
Also the economic performance of the regions – measured by the GDP growth and the investment 
per capita (INVPOP) –has a negative impact on the unemployment rate. The second variable has a 
standard coefficient that is double compared with the first one. 
We find also interesting the value of the two structural factors coefficients. In fact, as it can be 
easily supposed, the unemployment rate is negatively correlated with the good performance of the 
regional labour market (high activity and employment rate, high share of employment in the 
industrial and in the advanced services sector) measured by the first factor (FF).  
Even if it is more difficult to explain the positive relationship between the unemployment rate and 
the second factor that is related to the high share of the services and high demographic density. In 
this case the results seem to confirm the empirical evidence - reported also in the third Progress 
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion in the EU – that the “cities act as centres of employment 
for a widely-drawn population, with one in every three jobs being taken by someone commuting into 
the city” (Commission of the European Communities, Third Progress Report on Cohesion, page 
22). For this reason the unemployment and social problems in the European Union assume a higher 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
independent variable. On the contrary, in our estimations the elasticity of a dependent variable is not constant because 
the model is linear.  
  17relevance in Urban centres as well as in the tertiary process that nowadays characterizes the EU 
economic development.  
.
  18Table 4 
Results of the Panel Data Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Unemployment rate 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)
  OLS  MLE  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
    coefficient  P-level  coefficient  P-level  coefficient P-level  coefficient  P-level
CONS 10.763 0.01 -16.871 0.00  -12.303 0.00 -24.931 0.00
FF    2.233 0.00 1.706 0.00 1.849 0.00 1.183 0.00
SF    1.388 0.00 1.784 0.00 1.578 0.00 2.633 0.00
GDPR 0.181 0.00 -0.046 0.02  -0.044 0.04 -0.037 0.08
INVPOP -0.002 0.01 -0.002 0.00  -0.002 0.00 -0.001 0.00
BUREAUCRACY 2.646 0.00 1.855 0.00  2.064 0.00 1.558 0.00
CENTR -0.083 0.00 0.047 0.00  0.029 0.01 0.077 0.00
CGF    -0.179 0.02 0.528 0.00 0.402 0.00 0.753 0.00
CFG2 0.001 0.13 -0.004 0.00  -0.003 0.00 -0.005 0.00
                 
Num.  obs.  1090   1090   1090   1090  
Num. groups      109   109   109  
R2              0.5777  
R2corr              0.5746  
F(8,1081)              184.87 0.00
Log likelihood      -2399.9584          
LR chi2(8)      378.58 0.00         
R-sq within          0.2704   0.2929  
R-sq between          0.4689   0.2909  
R-sq overall          0.4466   0.2861  
Random effect u_i                 
Corr(u_i,X)            0   -0.392700
Sigma u          3.1659   5.289283  
Sigma e          1.7714   1.771356  
rho (% of the variance due to u)          0.7616   0.899155  
Wald chi2(8)          479.46      
F(8,973)             50.39 0.000
Hausmann Test  (Ho : corr (ui, X)=0) 
CHI2 (  8); Prob>CHI2            113.92 0.000
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Table 5 
Mean, Standard deviation, 
coefficients, (fixed effect), standard coefficients, elasticity at mean value  
Variable Mean  s.d  .    parameter c  s  el 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE   10.885 6.064       
CONSTANT     -24.931  
FF -0.300 1.766 1.183 0.344 -0.033 
SF 0.171 1.384 2.633 0.601 0.041 
GDPR 2.029 3.260 -0.037 -0.020 -0.007 
INVPOP 50.239 178.694 -0.001 -0.044 -0.007 
BUREAUCRACY 3.974 0.143 1.558 0.037 0.569 
CENTR 25.747 16.247 0.077 0.207 0.183 
CGF 73.082 8.256 0.753
CGF2 5409.132 991.429 -0.005 0.199 0.289 
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The 130 European regions. 
 
sigla Regioni  sigla Regions 
  Belgium – NUTS 1 – Regions     
be1 Région  Bruxelles-
capitale/Brussels hoofdstad 
gewest 
be2 Vlaams  Gewest 
be3 Région  Wallonne     
dk  Denmark – NUTS 0 – Nation     
  Federal Republic of Germany (including ex-GDR from 1991) 
- NUTS 1 – Lander 
de1 Baden-Württemberg  de2 Bayern 
de3 Berlin  de4 Brandenburg 
de5 Bremen  de6 Hamburg 
de7 Hessen  de8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 
de9 Niedersachsen  dea  Nordrhein-Westfalen 
deb Rheinland-Pfalz  dec  Saarland 
ded Sachsen  dee  Sachsen-Anhalt 
def Schleswig-Holstein  deg Thüringen 
  Greece – NUTS 2 – Development regions 
gr11  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  gr12  Kentriki Makedonia 
gr13 Dytiki  Makedonia  gr14 Thessalia 
gr21 Ipeiros  gr22 Ionia  Nisia 
gr23  Dytiki Ellada  gr24  Sterea Ellada 
gr25 Peloponnisos  gr3  Attiki 
gr41  Voreio Aigaio  gr42  Notio Aigaio 
gr43 Kriti     
  Spain – NUTS 2 – Comunidades autonomas 
es11  Galicia  es12  Principado de Asturias 
es13 Cantabria  es21 Pais  Vasco 
es22  Comunidad Foral de Navarra  es23  La Rioja 
es24 Aragón  es3  Comunidad  de  Madrid 
es41  Castilla y León  es42  Castilla-la Mancha 
es43 Extremadura  es51 Cataluña 
es52 Comunidad  Valenciana  es53 Baleares 
es61 Andalucia  es62 Murcia 
es63  Ceuta y Melilla  (ES)  es7  Canarias  (ES) 
  France – NUTS 2 – Régions 
Fr1  Île de France  fr21  Champagne-Ardenne 
Fr22 Picardie  fr23  Haute-Normandie 
Fr24 Centre  fr25  Basse-Normandie 
Fr26  Bourgogne  fr3  Nord - Pas-de-Calais 
Fr41 Lorraine  fr42  Alsace 
Fr43  Franche-Comté  fr51  Pays de la Loire 
Fr52 Bretagne  fr53  Poitou-Charentes 
Fr61 Aquitaine  fr62  Midi-Pyrénées 
Fr63 Limousin  fr71  Rhône-Alpes 
Fr72 Auvergne  fr81  Languedoc-Roussillon 
Fr82 Provence-Alpes-Côte  d'Azur  fr83  Corse 
Ie  Ireland – NUTS 0 – Nations 
  Italy – NUTS 2 – Regioni 
It11 Piemonte  it12  Valle  d'Aosta 
It13 Liguria  it2  Lombardia 
It31 Trentino-Alto  Adige  it32  Veneto 
  21It33 Friuli-Venezia  Giulia  it4  Emilia-Romagna 
It51 Toscana  it52  Umbria 
It53 Marche  it6  Lazio 
It71 Abruzzo  it72  Molise 
It8 Campania  it91  Puglia 
It92 Basilicata  it93  Calabria 
Ita Sicilia  itb Sardegna 
Lu Luxembourg     
  Netherlands – NUTS 2 – Provincies 
nl1 Noord-Nederland  nl2 Oost-Nederland 
nl3 West-Nederland  nl4 Zuid-Nederland 
  Austria – NUTS 2 – Bundesländer 
at11 Burgenland  at12 Niederösterreich 
at13 Wien  at21 Kärnten 
at22 Steiermark  at31 Oberösterreich   
at32 Salzburg  at33 Tirol 
at34 Vorarlberg     
  Portugal - NUTS 2 groupings 
pt11 Norte  pt12 Centro  (P) 
pt13  Lisboa e Vale do Tejo  pt14  Alentejo 
pt15 Algarve  pt2  Açores    (PT) 
pt3 Madeira    (PT)     
  Finland- NUTS 1 – Manner-Suomi/Ahvenanmaa 
Fi1 Manner-Suomi  fi2  Åland 
se  Sweden- NUTS 0 – Nation  
  United Kingdom –NUTS 1 – Nation 
ukc  North East  ukd  North West (including Merseyside) 
uke  Yorkshire and The Humber  ukf  East Midlands 
ukg West  Midlands  ukh Eastern 
uki London  ukj South  East 
ukk South  West  ukl  Wales 
ukm Scotland  ukn  Northern  Ireland 
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